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TRIMMING MILITARY JUDISDICTION: AN UNREALISTIC SOLUTION TO
REFORMING MILITARY JUSTICE
DENNIS R. HUNT*
Legislativ6; concern with the inequities of Amer-
ican military justice was much in evidence during
the post World War II era.1 In 1950 the Congress
enacted the 'Uniform Code of Military Justice
partially in an attempt to remedy the injustice of
military law which was demonstrated during World
War II. The controversial Vietnam involvement
with its masses of draftees subject to military
discipline again drew attention to courts-martial
practice3 and praduced a less pervasive reform
measure, the Military Justice Act of 1968.4 The
latter, howe~er, did not wholly satisfy critics of
military criminal law, and recently legislation pro-
viding further reforms of court-martial practice
has been suggested by Senators Bayh, 5 Hatfield,6
and Congressman WhalenY Though not disturb-
ing the basic, structure of the military criminal
process,8 these proposals offer extensive modifica-
*Major, United States Army, Judge Advocate
General's Corps; B.S., Northwestern University, 1961;
L.L.B., Harvard Lav" School, 1964; L.L.M. North-
western University, 1971; presently military judge for
the United States Army in Frankfurt. The present
article is a section of a thesis prepared in partial ful-
fillment of the requirements for the L.L.M. degree.
1 See, e.g., Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Armed Services on H.R. 2498, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1949); H. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1949); Hearings Before a Snbconm. of the Senate Comm.
on Armed Services on S. 857 and H.R. 4080, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1949); S. REP. No. 846, 81st Cong., Ist Sess.
(1949).
2Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1, 64 Stat. 108.
3 See Ervin, Tlie Military Justice Act of 1968, 5 WAKE
FoREST I.L. Rav. 223, 223-42 (1969).
4 Act of October 24, 1968, 82 Stat. 1335.
5S. 1127, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [Hereinafter
cited as Bayh Bill]. This legislation, in a slightly modi-
fied form, was previously introduced as S. 4191, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) and H.R. 18835, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970).
6 S. 4168-S. 4178, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), re-
printed in 116 CONG. Rxc. S12, 669-73 (daily ed.,
August 4, 1970).
7 H.R. 6901, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). This legisla-
tion was previously introduced as S. 3117, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969).
8 Present law provides four strata of military crim-
inal proceedings. The most serious offenses are tried by
general courts-martial composed of a judge and five or
more jurors. 10 U.S.C. § 816(1) (Supp. V, 1970). The
penalties for offenses heard in general court are those
provided in the statutes defining the offenses or are
established by the President, id. § 856, and include
tions of court-martial practice. Against the back-
ground of these legislative proposals, this article
will evaluate the efficacy of one frequently sug-
gested remedy for the ills of the military criminal
legal process: the exclusion of certain categories of
offenses from military jurisdiction.
When viewed from an historical perspective,
proposals to modify the jurisdiction of military
courts have not been infrequent. Legislative and
judicial history readily illustrate that military
criminal jurisdiction in the United States is some-
thing other than an immutable jurisdictional
preserve. 9 The first legislative definition 0 of do-
imprisonment, fines, forfeiture of military salary, loss of
military grade, punitive discharge from the armed
forces, and capital punishment. Special courts-martial
include a jury of three, id. § 816 (2), and may try any
non-capital offense, id. § 819, but the penalty adjudged
may not exceed confinement at hard labor for six
months, reduction to the lowest enlisted grade, and
forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for six months.
Id. A punitive discharge may also be returned by the
special court, but only if a verbatim record of trial is
kept. Id. Summary courts-martial are composed of
only one officer who serves as judge, jury, prosecution
and defense counsel; he need not be legally trained. Id.
§ 816 (3); Manual for Courts-Martial, United States,
1969 para. 79 (rev. ed. 1969) [Hereinafter cited as
MCM 1969].
Limited like the special court-martial to non-capital
offenses, the summary court may not return a sentence
in excess of confinement at hard labor for 30 days,
forfeiture of two-thirds of one months pay, and reduc-
tion to the lowest enlisted grade. 10 U.S.C. § 820 (Supp.
V, 1970). Use of the summary court-martial has de-
clined in the past decade, see Annual Reports of the
United States Court of MAfilitary Appeals and the Judge
Advocate General of the Armed Forces and the General
Counsel of the Department of Transportation (1961-
1969); and the Bayh legislation would eliminate this
forum, Bayh Bill §§ 816-19. Below this tripartite
court system are administrative disciplinary measures,
the "Article 15" or "Captains Mast," which are im-
posed by the offender's commanding officer without an
evidentiary hearing. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1964). The sanc-
tions possible here depend to some extent upon the
grade and command position of the officer imposing
punishment, but do not include confinement at hard
labor nor the degree of sanctions possible in the sum-
mary court-martial. Id. The average rate per 1,000 for
these various proceedings in the Army during the last
quarter of 1970 was: general courts, 0.16; special
courts, 1.79; summary courts, 0.92; Article 15, 16.75.
71-6 JALS 6-7 (Dept. of Army Pamphlet 27-71-6).
9 Military courts and military criminal jurisdiction
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mestic court-martial jurisdiction was a product
of the Continental Congress in 177611 and took
cognizance of military offenses and non-capital
common law crimes when the latter were to the
prejudice and good order of military discipline
2
During the Civil War, Congress expanded court-
martial jurisdiction of the Army" to include cer-
tain common law crimes committed by service-
men without regard to the offenses' impact on
military discipline and order, providing the
crimes occurred in time of war. Shortly before
World War I, Congress again moved to enlarge
court-martial jurisdiction over servicemen by in-
cluding in the military purview a wide range of
non-capital, civilian-type offenses which were
triable in time of peace,'14 and jurisdiction of
capital crimes-murder and rape--in time of
war.15 The final expansion of military jurisdiction
came in 1950 when Congress enacted the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. The Uniform Code
purported to extend domestic court-martial juris-
diction to all civilian offenses, whether capital
or not, committed by servicemen in time of
peace.' 6
are not inevitable features of a national military estab-
lishment. Since World War II, all domestic offenses of
servicemen in the military forces of the German Fed-
eral Republic have been tried in regular civilian courts,
and the military forces within themselves may exercise
only very minor disciplinary powers. Mority, The Ad-
ministration of Justice Within the Armed Forces of the
German Federal Republic, 7 MiL. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1960).
"0 The present power of Congress to create and de-
fine the jurisdiction of military courts is derived from
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, which states: "The
Congress shall have the Power To: To make rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
forces." See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261,
273 (1969).
" Articles of War of 1776, reprinted in WINTHROP,
MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 961 (2d. ed. 1970).
2 A crime which is to the prejudice and good order of
military discipline is defined as an act which must have
been committed under such circumstances as to have
directly offended against the government and discipline
of the military state. Id. at 723-24. Early courts-mar-
tial also assumed jurisdiction of servicemen's domestic
offenses when civilian courts declined to prosecute.
Rice, O'Callahan v. Parker: Court-Ma.'tial Jurisdiction,
"Service Connection," Confusion and the Serviceman, 51
MIL. L. REv. 41, 51-54 (1971).
"3 Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 30, 12 Stat. 736.
Congress allowed differing jurisdictional limitations for
Navy courts. See, e.g., Articles for Better Government
of the Navy, Act of April 23, 1800, ch. 33, 2 Stat. 45.
'4 These crimes included insurrection, rebellion,
murder, assault and battery with intent to kill, man-
slaughter, mayhem, wounding by shooting or stabbing
with intent to commit murder, robbery, arson, burglary,
rape, assault and battery with intent to commit rape
and larceny. 1916 Articles of War, art. 93, 39 Stat. 664.
15Id. at art. 92.
'6 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 802-03, 805, 877-934 (1964).
This furthest reach of the jurisdiction of the
military court-martial, as defined in the 1950
Uniform Code of Military justice, was soon to
be eroded, however. The Supreme Court responded
to the 1950 legislation by striking down peripheral
provisions which included civilians within the
court-martial jurisdiction; the Court found that
there was no jurisdiction in peace-time to court-
martial military dependents abroad for capital'
or non-capital offenses,' no jurisdiction to court-
martial ex-servicemen for offenses committed
while they were in the military,19 and no jurisdic-
tion to try citizen military employees abroad in
time of peace.' 0
The Court's attempts to reduce the scope of
military jurisdiction, however, did not end with
limiting jurisdiction over civilians. In 1969 the
Supreme Court restricted the authority of courts-
martial to try servicemen's offenses which were
subject to the jurisdiction of civilian courts."
'7 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (on rehearing).
Article 2(11) of the 1950 act purported to extend court-
martial jurisdiction to "persons serving with, employed
by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the
United States... ." The Bayh legislative proposal
would eliminate this provision. Bayh Bill at § 802.
i8 Kinsella v. U.S. ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234
(1960).
9 Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). Servicemen
who are discharged and later re-enlist are subject to
court-martial for offenses committed during the prior
enlistment. United States v. Wilson, 15 U.S.C.M.A.
222, 35 C.M.R. 194 (1965). Recent concern with Viet-
nam "war crimes" of discharged American servicemen
has prompted proposals that such offenses be triable in
federal civilian courts. See, e.g., FiNAL RE:PORT OF TnE
NATIONAL COrsiSSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRI-
INAL LAWS, § 208(f)-(h), commentary at 22 (1971).
"0 Grisham v. Hogan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); McElroy
v. U.S. ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960). The
United States Court of Military Appeals has recently
extended this doctrine, holding that, despite actual
hostilities, military employees in Vietnam are beyond
court-martial jurisdiction in the absence of a Congres-
sional declaration of war. United States v. Averette, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 363, 41 C.M.R. 363 (1970).
21 The ruling substantially reduces double jeopardy
problems associated with military criminal proceedings.
The double jeopardy protection, cf. 10 U.S.C. §§ 814,
844 (1964), bars prosecution for the same offense in
military and federal courts. Grafton v. United States,
206 U.S. 333 (1907). The protection has not been ap-
plied to identical prosecutions in courts-martial and
state courts, however. MCM 1969, para. 215b; United
States v. Borys, 39 C.M.R. 608 (1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 259 (1969); In
re Stubbs, 133 F. 1012 (C.C. Wash. 1905); see Coleman
v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 513-15, 518 (1878). Service
policy directs that men first tried in civilian courts will
"normally" not be subjected to military disciplinary
proceedings unless further punitive action is necessary
to maintain discipline. Army Reg. 27-10, ch. 6 (Novem-
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In O'Callahan v. Parkern the Court held that
the military lacked jurisdiction to try a service-
man's domestic offenses which were not "service
connected." 23 Subject to extensive criticism for
the vagueness of this jurisdictional test,24 the
Supreme Court in 1970 further elucidated the
concept of "service connection" in Relford v.
Commandante2 by enumerating twelve factors
which might in combination establish that an
offense is not service connected and therefore
beyond the jurisdiction of a court-martial.26 The
Relford factors do clarify O'Callahan's import to
some extent, but the balancing test which Reaford
ber 26, 1968); Judge Advocate General (Navy) Instruc-
tion P 5800.7 at § 0106(d) (January 3, 1969). The
O'Catlahan rule reduces the circumstances in which such
an overlap of state and military juristiction is possible
by excluding the latter altogether. See Gaynor, Prqu-
dicial and Discreditable Military Conduct: A Critical
Appraisal of the General Article, 22 HAs rNos L.J. 259,
264 (1971); Nelson, Court-Martiat Jurisdiction Over
Servicemen for Civilian Offenses: An Analysis of O'Cal-
lahan v. Parker, 54 MINx. L. RExv. 1, 55-56 (1970).
Similarly, the Bayh legislation would abolish the juris-
diction of military and state courts to try the defendant
for an offense previously heard in the other forum.
Bayh Bill at § 844 (a)(2).
22395 U.S. 258 (1969).
23Id. at 272. Sergeant O'Callahan was convicted by
court-martial for attempted rape, housebreaking, and
assault with intent to rape. While off duty and in ci-
vilian clothes in Honolulu, the defendant had broken
into a hotel room and attacked its occupant. In finding
no "service connection," the court stressed that the
defendant was properly on pass from his duty station at
Fort Shafter, the offense was unrelated to the defend-
ant's military duties, the offense did not occur on post,
the victim had no connection with the military com-
munity, the regular civilian courts were open, the of-
fense occurred domestically at peacetime, and the case
involved no factor of defiance of military authority,
security of a military post, or hazard to military prop-
erty. Id. at 273-74. The court's emphasis on the lack of
Bill of Rights protections in court-martial proceedings,
id. at 261-66, as a reason for shifting jurisdiction to
civilian courts has caused the United States Court of
Military Appeals to affirm military jurisdiction even
where "service connection" is lacking when the de-
fendant, because of the petty nature of his crime, would
not be entitled to such constitutional protections in
local civilian courts. United States v. Sharkey, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 26, 41 C.M.R. 26 (1969).
24 See Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 356
n.1 (1971).
s Id.
26 The Relford factors are
1. The serviceman's proper absence from the base.
2. The crime's commission away from the base.
3. Its commission at a place not under military
control.
4. Its commission within our territorial limits and
not in an occupied zone of a foreign country.
5. Its commission in peacetime and its being un-
related to authority stemming from the war
power.
6. The absence of any connection between the de-
fendant's military duties and the crime.
created imposes a difficult task for courts which
must apply it and promises varying results27
until authoritative case precedent develops.
The present scope of court-martial jurisdiction
of offenses committed by service personnel as
defined in the Uniform Code of Military Justice
and Supreme Court decisions, is subject to further
limitation by two other sources. The first, an
agreementss between the Departments of Defense
and Justice, 29 provides for division of investiga-
tive and prosecutory responsibilities when a serv-
iceman's crime is triable in both federal and
military courts. As a general rule, offenses com-
mitted on base by servicemen against other per-
sons residing on the base will be tried in military
courts; major offenses against government prop-
7. The victim's not being engaged in the per-
formance of any duty relating to the military.
8. The presence and availability of a civilian
court in which the case can be prosecuted.
9. The absence of any flouting of military author-
ity.
10. The absence of any threat to a military post.
11. The absence of any violation of military prop-
erty. One might add still another factor im-
plicit in the others:
12. The offense's being among those traditionally
prosecuted in civilian courts.
401 U.S. at 365.
Corporal Relford was convicted by court-martial for
rape and kidnapping on two separate occasions. Both
transactions occurred within Fort Dix and McGmre
Air Force Base while the defendant was off duty and in
civilian clothes. His first victim was the visiting sister of
another serviceman, the second the wife of a service-
man. The Supreme Court concluded that "service con-
nection" elements 4, 6, 8, 11, 12 and possibly 5 and 9
tended to establish that Relford's offenses were not in
military jurisdiction; the contrary was true of elements
1, 2, 3, 7 and 10. Id. at 366. Concluding with a very
geographic emphasis, the court held "that when a
serviceman is charged with an offense committed on or
at the geographical boundary of a military post and
violative of the security of a person or of property there,
that offense may be tried by a court-martial...." Id.
at 369.27 Compare United States v. DeRonda, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
575, 40 C.M.R. 287 (1969) (Off post, off duty posses-
sion of marijuana is service connected) -with Moylan v.
Laird, 305 F. Supp. 551 (D.R.I. 1969) (enjoining court-
martial proceedings for off post, off duty possession of
marijuana as not service connected).
28 Under such regulations as the Secretary con-
cerned may prescribe, a member of the armed
forces accused of an offense against civil author-
ity may be delivered, upon request, to the civil
authority for trial.
10 U.S.C. § 814(a) (1964).
2 9Memorandum of Understanding Between the De-
partments of Justice and Defense Relating to the Investi-
gation and Prosecution of Crimes Over Which the Two
Departments Have Concurrent Jurisdiction (July 19,
1955), reprinted in pertinent part in Army Reg. 27-10,
ch. 7 (November 26, 1968).
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erty, cases involving non-military co-accuseds
or victims, and off-post crimes unrelated to or-
ganized military maneuvers are to be tried in
federal district courts.30 Secondly, treaties and
executive agreements3' with foreign governments
grant to host countries of United States military
installations primary jurisdiction to try service-
men for "civilian offenses" not involving Ameri-
can victims and not done in the performance of
military duty as well as exclusive jurisdiction of
offenses relating to the security of the host state.33
Against this history of current court-martial
jurisdiction, the critics of military criminal law
have repeatedly suggested various schemes to
even further limit the offenses which courts-
martial may try.3' More specifically, Senator
Hatfield in 1970 offered legislation3 4 proposing
elimination of military jurisdiction over domestic
offenses which involve the physical safety and
security of the nation and over acts which would
be viewed as offenses regardless of the military
status of the defendant.3 Such a division, 6 how-
30 Id.
31 See, eg , NATO Status of Forces Agreement, June
19, 1951 (1953), 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
32 Id., art. VII. Though more than 80 percent of pri-
mary jurisdiction is waived back to American military
authorities by foreign governments, in 1969 American
servicemen were tried for approximately 46,000 offenses
in foreign courts; 75 percent of these were traffic cases,
and slightly more than 100 servicemen were serving
sentences in host nation prisons. Army Times, January
20, 1971, at c, col. 1. Foreign courts convict United
States servicemen in more than 98 percent of the cases
they try, but only 1.3 percent of those convicted are
sentenced to jail. Id.
33 See, e.g., Averna, Citizen Servicemen and their Con-
stilitional Rights, 43 Tsmn'. L.Q. 213, 226 (1970); Com-
ment, Military Trial of Civilian Offenses: Drumhead
Justice in the Land of the Free, 43 So. CAL. L. Rxv. 356,
373 (1970); Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of
Military Personnel Before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, pursuant
to S. Res. 260, 87th Cong. 2d Sess., at 301 (1962) [Here-
inafter cited as 1962 Hearings].
-4S. 4178, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 5-6 (1970).
35 116 CONG. REc. S12,667 (daily ed. August 4, 1970)
(remarks of Senator Hatfield).
36 Under this limitation, courts-martial in the United
States would only be able to try the offenses of: fraudu-
lent or unlawful enlistment, appointment or separation.
10 U.S.C. §§ 883-84 (1964); desertion, id. at § 885; ab-
sence without leave, id. at § 886; missing movement,
id. at § 887; assaulting or willfully disobeying a supenor
commissioned officer, id. at § 890; insubordination to-
ward a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer, id.
at § 891; failure to obey an order or regulation, id. at
§ 892; cruelty or maltreatment, id. at § 893; resistance,
breach of arrest, escape, id. at § 895; wrongful release
of a prisoner, id. at § 896; unlawful detention, id. at
§ 897; noncompliance with military procedural require-
ments, id. at § 898; false official statements, id. at
ever, does not appear to be ideal. For one thing,
this allocation of offenses between military and
civilian courts curiously excludes from military
jurisdiction a number of traditional military of-
fenses which are foreign to civilian criminal law
and depend upon martial evidentiary factors and
legal concepts: mutiny;37 misbehavior before the
enemy;13 subordinate compelling surrender; 9 im-
proper use of a countersign;
40 forcing a safeguard;4
conversion of captured or abandoned property;",
misconduct as a prisoner of war,4" and improper
hazarding of a vessel." For another, this cate-
gorization of crimes as "civilian" or "military"
ignores circumstances in which the former assume
significance only because of their character within
§ 907; loss, damage, destruction or wrongful disposition
of military property of the United States, id. at § 908;
waste, destruction or spoilage of non-military property
of the United States, id. at § 909; drunk on duty, id. at
§ 912; misbehavior of a sentinel, id. at § 913; and ma-
lingering, id. at § 915. See generally, 116 CONG. REc.
S12,672-73 (daily ed. August 4, 1970).
Also excluded from the Hatfield list of offenses for
'Which a serviceman may be tried in any court are con-
duct unbecoming an officer, 10 U.S.C. § 933, and con-
duct which is service discrediting or prejudicial to good
order and discipline within the military, id. at § 934;
these may only be prosecuted through military adminis-
trative punishments. Federal district courts would have
jurisdiction to try the following domestic offenses of
United States servicemen: accessory after the fact, id.
at § 878; solicitation to commit desertion, mutiny,
misbehavior before the enemy, or sedition, id. at § 882;
contempt toward public officials, id. at § 888; disre-
spect toward a superior commissioned officer, id. at
§ 889; mutiny and sedition, id. at § 894; misbehavior
before the enemy, id. at § 899; subordinate compelling
surrender, id. at § 900; improper use of countersign,
id. at § 901; forcing a safeguard, id. at § 902; conversion
of captured or abandoned property, id. at § 903; aiding
the enemy, id. at § 904; misconduct as a prisoner of
war, id. at § 905; spying, id. at § 906; improper hazard-
ing of vessel, id. at § 910; drunken or reckless driving,
id. at § 911; duelling, id. at § 914; riot or breach of
peace, id. at § 916; provoking speeches or gestures, id.
at § 917; murder, id. at § 918; manslaughter, id. at
§ 919; rape, carnal knowledge, id. at § 920; larceny,
wrongful appropriation, id. at § 921; robbery, id. at
§ 922; forgery, id. at § 923; bad checks, id. at § 923a,
maiming, id. at § 924; sodomy, id. at § 925; arson, id. at
§ 926; extortion, id. at § 927; assault, id. at j 928;
burglary, id. at § 929; housebreaking, id. at § 930;
perjury, id. at § 931; frauds against the United States,
id. at § 932.
17 Id. at § 894.
11 Id. at § 899.
39 Id. at § 900.
4 Id. at § 901.
41 Id. at § 902. This baroque offense is committed b%
one who breaches security measures designed to pro-
tect persons, places or property of the enemy or of a
neutral in time of war or belligerency. M.C.M. 1969,
para. 181.
42 10 U.S.C. § 903 (1964).
'- Id. at § 904.
14 Id. at § 910.
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the military community: the soldier who assaults
his off-duty commanding officer in public on a
military post has committed a far more socially
disturbing delict that a non-military court is
likely to recognize or punish. The Hatfield proc-
posals, then, are nothing more than a facile but
arbitrary alternative to the more demanding
O'Callahan-Relford criteria which allocate partic-
ular offenses to the courts of the jurisdition
most concerned with the offense.
In addition to being arbitrary in terms of
classification, the Hatfield.proposals are also sub-
ject to question on a practical level. The impact
of O'Callahan and Relford suggests that excluding
"civilian" offenses from military jurisdiction may
not be a numerically significant reform. Even
before O'Callahan, the military was only prose-
cuting 15 percent of the domestic offenses of its
off-duty personnel,45 and 85 to 90 percent of
servicemen now in military prisons are being
punished for absence offenses.48 In view of the
predominantly military nature of offenses pres-
ently tried in military courts and the shift to
civilian jurisdiction accomplished by O'Callahan,
comparatively few prosecutions would be affected
by redrawing jurisdiction for non-military crimes.
0
45 Brief for Respondent at 27 n. 16, O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
46 Report of the Special Givilian Committee for the
Study of the United States Army Confinement System at
101 (1970). For a severe criticism of the committee
membership, investigative technique and report, see
GARnNEx, THE UNLAwFuL CONCERT: AN ACCOUNT OF
THE PREsImo MUTINY CASE 216 (1970); SnxRnn,
MILITARY JUSTICE Is TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC
Is TO Music 22 (1970). Professor Sherman, a prolific
commentator on military law, has estimated that 90
percent of the crimes that bring servicemen to military
jails are offenses that do not appear in civilian law. Re-
marks of Edward Sherman at the Federal Bar Associa-
tion Convention, September 17, 1970, Washington
D.C., reported in 7 BNA CRIM. L. RExPR. 2523, 2529
(1970).
47 116 CONG. REc. S10,443 (daily ed. July 1, 1970)
(remarks of Senator Bayh). However, during the first
eleven months of 1970, a median monthly percentage of
40.5 of the charges appearing in convictions automat-
ically reviewed by the Army Court of Military Review
were "civilian" type offenses. UNITED STATES ARmY
JUDICIARY RECORDS CONTROL AND ANALYSIS BRANCH,
JANUARY-NOVEMBER 1970 ANALYSIS OF GENERAL AND
SPECIAL (BCD) COURT-MARTIAL DATA, paras. 5-6.
This data is subject to some qualification. First, it only
reflects convictions in which the adjudged sentence in-
cluded a punitive discharge or confinement for one year
or more. See 10 U.S.C. § 66 (Supp. V, 1970). Missing
are the majority of Army prosecutions in special courts-
martial. Second, military practice favors joinder of
criminal charges, MCM 1969, paras. 24, 25, hence the
figure does not necessarily reflect the number of trials in
which such civilian offenses were present. Finally, this
data includes offenses occurring outside the United
If Congressional interest and energy to reform
military criminal law is finite, then such jurisdic-
tion reshaping should be abandoned for measures
which would improve the functions of military
courts with regard to persons and offenses pres-
ently within their jurisdiction.
Additional reasons also raise doubt whether
the limitation of military jurisdiction should go
beyond O'Callahan-Relford. Paradoxically, trans-
fer of offenses from military to civilian jurisdic-
tion would pose numerous disadvantages to mili-
tary defendants themselves." At the outset, the
military defendant in civilian criminal court will
face financial demands which do not exist in
military courts like bail, counsel fees, and witness
expenses. 49 The majority of military defendants
States and its possessions where no American civilian
courts are available; among the studied cases the me-
dian monthly percentage for such "outside" offenses
was 37. Id.
"8 Occasionally the argument is made that the mili-
tary would be disadvantaged by loss of mobility result-
ing from any jurisdictional shift which would put large
numbers of servicemen at the discretion of local civilian
courts. This proposition is reinforced by the military's
sparing use of pretrial confinement within its own jus-
tice system. See, Boiler, Pretrial Restraint in the Mili-
tary, 50 MIL. L. REv. 71, 97 (1970); Sherman, Military
Injustice, 4TIAL 21, 23 (1968). The greater reliance of
the civilian courts on this technique is shown by the
fact that more than half of the 160,830 persons held in
local civilian jails in early 1970 were not there as a re-
sult of a criminal conviction, CENSUS BUREAU AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, NA-
TIONAL JAIL CENSUS, reported at 8 BNA CRIM. L.
REPTR. 2276 (1971). Comparatively speedier trials are
afforded in military courts. Sherman, The Cizilianiza-
tion of Military Law, 22 ME. L. REv. 3, 72 (1970).
This argument against civilian jurisdiction of service-
men's offenses must first be discounted by the fact that
the military survives though already sharing jurisdic-
tion with civilian courts through the workings of
O'Callahan, the status of forces agreements, and the
understanding with the Justice Department. See text
accompanying notes supra. Clearly there is no inherent
reason why civilian court jurisdiction should unneces-
sarily entangle servicemen, for civilian judges could give
calendar preference to military defendants and respond
to the needs of military exigencies. Civilian jurisdiction
might be subject to removal on showing of military
need. See Comment, supra note 33 at 380. In the United
Kingdom, British courts-martial and civilian courts
share jurisdiction over almost all servicemen's offenses,
and the final decision as to trial forum rests upon a co-
operative evaluation of a variety of factors-reminis-
cent of the Justice and Defense Department agreement,
(see note 21 supra and accompanying text)-including
military exigencies. Stuart-Smith, Military Law: Its
History, Administration and Practice, 85 L.Q. REv. 478,
491-92 (1969) (British).
49 While there is no bail right in the military, United
States v. Wilson, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 337, 27 C.M.R. 411
(1959), pretrial confinement is less frequent than in
civilian courts, see note supra and accompanying text,
and pretrial freedom is not conditioned upon a deposit
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are under 21 years old and in the lower enlisted
grades; 50 their military salary levels51 would prob-
ably qualify them as indigents for purposes of
obtaining a court-appointed defender in a federal
court.A2 But if the military defendant's offense
is minor, he may not be entitled to appointed
counsel in the civilian court,- and if the offense
is punishable by no more than confinement for
six months, he may receive no jury trial." In
military practice, however, no matter how minor
the offense, the defendant has a right, on request,
to representation by a fully qualified lawyer and
trial by a military jury.
55
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the
military defendant would receive any fairer trial
under civilian jurisdiction. Military personnel-
sometimes because of racial or ethnic factors,
and sometimes just because they are military
personnel-may well find that civilian jurors in
areas surrounding military installations are sig-
nificantly biased against them. 56 In addition, the
state or federal jury which the military defendant
faces will not contain persons from his special
community, that is, military personnel on active
of money. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 9-10 (1964); MCM 1969,
paras. 18-22. A qualified lawyer is provided without
charge to all general and special court-martial defend-
ants. 10 U.S.C. § 827 (Supp. V, 1970). No military de-
fendant may be subjected over his objection to dis-
ciplinary or judicial proceedings where he is not so
represented-except in the case of military personnel
embarked on a vessel. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 815, 820 (Supp.
V, 1970). In courts-martial, defense witness fees and
costs for expert witnesses are paid for by the govern-
ment. MCM 1969, para. 115.
"See ANALYsis OF GENERAL AND SPECIAL (BCD)
COURT-MARTIAL DATA supra note 47, at paras. 7-8.
51 The 1972 monthly base pay rates for Army en-
listed personnel in the lowest grades are: Private (E-1)
$288.00; Private (E-2) $320.70; Private First Class
(E-3) $333.60; Corporal or Specialist (E-4) $346.80.
2 Franks, Prosecution in Civil Courts of kinor Of-
fenses Committed on Military Installations, 61 MIL. L.
REv. 85, 111 (1971). It is conceivable that the military
could continue to provide free legal counsel to service-
men tried in civilian courts. Though presently military
lawyers do not represent servicemen in civilian court
proceedings, a pilot program is operating at three Army
posts which provides Army counsel for servicemen in
civilian criminal and civil cases providing 1) the service-
man is financially unable to retain his own counsel, and
2) civilian legal aid is unavailable. Army Times, Jan-
uary 20, 1971 at 4, col. 3.
5 Order Prescribing Rules of Procedure For the Trial of
Minor Offenses Before (Federal) Magistrates, 8 BNA
Cium. L. RRPTR. 3091 (U.S. January 27, 1971).
4See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
5 10 U.S.C. §§ 815-16, 820, 827 (Supp. V, 1970).
56 Gardner, supra note 46, at 223; Nelson, supra
note 22, at 63.
duty.7 It is also true that in many instances the
defendant may not be guaranteed an indictment
from a grand jury," for many states have aban-
doned or significantly restricted this procedure."0
Moreover, in civilian courts the military defendant
will find far more constricted discovery rights than
exist in military courts,60 and nothing resembling
the Uniform Code of Military Justice's automatic
appellate review and free representation for all
major convictions.6" Considering all these factors,
a number of civilian critics of military practice
have conceded that in many circumstances the
military defendant facing trial for a "civilian"
offense would be better served by a military court
than its local, civilian counterpart.
6 2
Besides possible disadvantage to the military
defendant, another perspective for regarding pro-
posed shifts of jurisdiction with caution is that of
possible effects on civilian legislators and law
enforcement authorities. Any legislative effort to
extend state court jurisdiction to civilian-type
crimes occurring on military enclaves or to extend
federal court power to offenses occurring off fed-
eral enclaves, and not otherwise proscribed in
federal domestic law, will encounter geographic
obstacles.0 Most large military posts contain a
hodge-podge of real estate parcels acquired at
different times and with different jurisdictional
understandings.6 Some tracts are in exclusive
federal jurisdiction, in others the state possesses
, See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1863, 1865 (Supp. V, 1970).
However there are estimated to be 27.5 million veterans
in the United States (Chicago Daily News, February
27, 1971, at 16, col. 4) who should bring some under-
standing of military life to those juries on which they
may serve.
8The grand jury is not constitutionally required of
the states. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884);
Moreford v. Hocker, 394 F.2d 169 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 392 U.S. 944 (1968).
59 See Spain, The Grand Jury, Past and Present: A
Survey, 2 Am. CRiu. L.Q. 119, 126-42 (1964).
60 Everett, Military Justice is to Justice..., 12 JAG
L. REv. 202, 208-09 (1970) (Air Force); Moyer, Pro-
cedural Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages Over
a Civilian Defendant, 51 Mu.. L. REv. 1, 11-14 (1971).
61 Id. at 27. Military law provides appellate counsel
and automatic appellate court review for all defendants
whose court-martial sentences include confinement at
hard labor for a year or a punitive discharge. 10 U.S.C.
§§ 865-66, 870 (Supp. V, 1970).6 2 Rlv.IN, G. I. RbOTs ASND] Asuy JusTIcz, THE
DRAFTEE's GUIDE To MILITARY LirE AND LAw 215
(paperback ed. 1970); 1962 Hearings at 353.
6O'Callahan handily escapes such problems by only
applying to cases in which court-martial jurisdiction is
presently concurrent with civilian jurisdiction.
64 Comment, Military Installations: Recent Legal De-
velopments, 11 MiL. L. Rr.v. 201, 202 (1961).
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exclusive legislative power, and in others the two
authorities share.65 As to federal jurisdiction tracts,
local police have no powers,6 6 and acts done there
are outside the present jurisdiction of state courts. 6
Any expansion of state court responsibilities into
these areas would require extensive legislative
action by state and federal government.6s Federal
courts may apply state criminal law to offenses
occurring on the federal tracts through the federal
assimilative crimes provision,69 but they ordinarily
have no authority over prosaic criminal acts
occurring off such tracts which are not expressly
proscribed in federal law. And further, in order
for state or federal courts to acquire jurisdiction
over servicemen's offenses proscribed in the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice but not in their
respective criminal codes, additional legislation
would be required.0
If such legislation were to shift significant
numbers of cases into civilian jurisdiction, there
would have to be a correlative transfer of respon-
sibility for law enforcement. It seems unlikely
that civilian authorities would be desirous of
assuming this burden. Many populous military
bases" are located in thinly populated rural coun-
ties which would be hard-pressed to provide legal
and law enforcement services for the large, sub-
stantially tax exempt federal military enclaves7 "
The already overburdened civilian criminal law
15 Id. at 202 n. 5.
86 Franks, supra note 52, at 95.
"7See Ryan v. Washington, 302 U.S. 186 (1937).
Comment, The New Boundaries of Military Juris-
diction, 43 Txm. L.Q. 166, 179 n. 80 (1970).
69 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
70 Thus the Hatfield proposal, S. 4178, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., § 5 (1970), grants federal courts jurisdiction to
try servicemen's domestic civilian offenses described in
the UNIFORU CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE. See note 36
supra. Paradoxically, though O'Callahan destroyed the
concurrent jurisdiction of courts-martial when state
jurisdiction existed, the Hatfield measure revives this
dual jurisdiction between state and federal courts.
7 The Army presently maintains 10 Stateside posts
with resident populations in excess of 20,000. The
largest, Fort Lewis, Washington, contains almost
40,000. The others, in descending order are: Fort Hood,
Texas; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Knox, Ken-
tucky; Fort Dix, New Jersey; Fort Carson, Colorado;
Fort Ord, California; Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort
Riley, Kansas; and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
Army Times, February 17, 1971, at 5, col. 1
72 It would be possible for the federal government to
provide financial resources or assistance for those civil
jurisdictions assuming law enforcement responsibility
for servicemen, see note 52 supra, but the Hatfield
legislation makes no provision for this.
processes" would be strained further by an en-
largement of their responsibilities. Thrown into
domestic courts, cases with primary impact in the
military community and beyond the ken and
political sensitivity of local prosecutors and courts
might become secondary to domestic business and
be manipulated to serve parochial interestsY4
Thus, the Supreme Court, in refusing to oust
military courts and extend domestic jurisdiction
to civilian type offenses occurring on a military
post, commented in Relford:
The distinct possibility exists that civil courts...
will have less than complete interest, concern and
capacity for all the cases that vindicate the mili-
tary's disciplinary problems within its own com-
munity....
Finally, with regard to offenses with primary im-
pact in the military community, it is uncertain
that non-military judges, administrators, and
jurors possess sufficient insight into the problems
of military society to render fitting judgementsy
6
In sum, further jurisdiction-shifting does not
seem a very helpful technique for improving the
level of justice for the serviceman or military
society. The present jurisdictional frontiers pro-
vided in O'Callahan and Re/ford, though some-
times difficult to fnd, do quite rationally allocate
servicemen's domestic offenses to trial in the
military or civilian community most affected by
the delict. Stripping the military of authority
to try offenses with primary impact in its own
community would place responsibility for such
law enforcement in the unenthusiastic hands of
those substantially unwilling and unable to exe-
cute it. A dubious advantage to the military
defendant himself, a shift of all servicemen's
civilian type offenses into domestic courts is a
reformer's feint which would have no bearing on
the great majority of defendants in military
courts and the need to improve the legal processes
therein.
7 Address by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to the
American Bar Association, August 10, 1970, reprinted
in The State of the Judiciary, FORBES, July 1, 1971, at 1.
74 Fianks, supra note 52, at 113; cf. Wilkinson, The
Narrowing Scope of Court-Martial Jurisdiction: O'Calla-
han v. Parker, 9 WAsHBunU L.J. 193, 208 (1970).
75 401 U.S. at 367-68.
76Address by Chief Justice Earl Warren, reprinted
in The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rlv.
181, 187 (1962).
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